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As smartphone ownership and Internet penetration in the Philippines are among
the highest in the world, the Philippines is well-positioned to leverage on digital
financial services as a means of alleviating poverty. However, with the increasingly
active implementation of the Philippine Data Privacy Act (‘DPA’), such potential
may not be realised. The privacy regulator, the National Privacy Commission, has
consistently set ‘notice and consent’ as the dominant mechanism for data
processing in the delivery of digital financial services, directly replicating the
European General Data Protection (‘GDPR’) standard.
Such replication not only disrupts the delivery and development of digital financial
services in developing countries, but also inherently conflicts with the use of Big
Data for innovation. Financial inclusion may be better achieved through a testand-learn, industry-based approach supervised by the central bank. Further,
regulation must be designed in proportion to the consumer risks digital financial
services pose.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Technological advancements have enabled disadvantaged and low-income
segments in developing countries to access basic financial services.1 Digital
payment platforms, e-money, and mobile-enabled solutions are some of the digital
financial services that deliver low-cost basic financial services in ways that
traditional banks have been unable to.2 However, with the processing of personal
data at the core of these technologies—from assessing credit-worthiness to
determining insurance risks—privacy concerns inevitably arise.3 Whilst increased
ownership of mobile devices presents an opportunity to elevate access to digital
financial services,4 the recent implementation of the Philippine Data Privacy Act
(DPA),5 which was influenced by the provisions of the Data Protection Directive
and interpreted according to the provisions of the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), makes an examination of the privacy implications of digital
financial services imperative. The task requires a delicate balance of priorities; done
right, the delivery of such services can potentially increase the GDP of developing
countries by as much as US$3.7 trillion by 2025, and generate as many as 95 million
jobs, fostering economic growth and creating millions of jobs in the process.6
The Philippines is a prime example of a developing country that can benefit
from financial inclusion, which is defined by the World Bank as access to
affordable financial products and services, delivered in a sustainable and efficient
manner.7 The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (the Philippine central bank, or ‘BSP’)
reports that a large segment of the Filipino adult population remains excluded from
1

See generally Advancing Financial Inclusion Metrics, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Fᴏʀᴜᴍ (Jan. 2018),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_White_Paper_Advancing_Financial_Inclusion_Metrics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/69TQ-65JM].
2
See generally Digital Financial Services, AFI, https://www.afi-global.org/policy-areas/digitalfinancial-services (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/A35P-8QK7].
3
See generally Satoshi Kambayashi, Big Data, Financial Services and Privacy, Tʜᴇ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪꜱᴛ
(Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/02/09/big-datafinancial-services-and-privacy [https://perma.cc/2SWG-KSPP].
4
Dᴀᴠɪᴅ Lᴇᴇ Kᴜᴏ Cʜᴜᴇɴ & Rᴏʙᴇʀᴛ H. Dᴇɴɢ, Handbook of Blockchain, Digital Finance, and
Inclusion: Chinatech, Mobile Security, and Distributed Ledger, 456 (Vol. 2, 2018).
5
Timothy Lyman and Kate Lauer, What Is Digital Financial Inclusion and Why Does It Matter?,
CGAP (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.cgap.org/blog/what-digital-financial-inclusion-and-why-doesit-matter.
6
Digital Finance Is Key to Increasing Financial Inclusion in Asia Pacific, AFI (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.afi-global.org/news/2017/11/digital-finance-key-increasing-financial-inclusion-asiapacific [https://perma.cc/646P-NJ4K].
7
Digital Financial Inclusion, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Bᴀɴᴋ,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/publication/digital-financial-inclusion (last
visited Sep. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/GD4A-JJ2K].
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the formal financial system, with only 22.6% having a formal financial account,8
and an even fewer 11.5% having a bank account—somehow lower than the
recorded 14.1% in 2015.9 Only 18% of Filipino adults have insurance, citing lack
of funds, lack of need, and high cost as the major reasons for not having one.10
Unsurprisingly, those without formal financial accounts or insurance belong to the
poorest sectors of society.11
Despite these figures, there is room for optimism: The Philippines is at the
cusp of digital transformation in financial services. With the potential to expand
access to basic financial services and serve as a great tool for financial inclusion,12
digital financial services can reach millions of poor Filipinos.13 Two powerful tools
that are essential in the delivery of digital financial services are at their disposal:
mobile phones and access to the Internet, with 59% of the Filipinos owning a
smartphone and Internet penetration of 55.5%, among the highest in the world.14
Mobile phones supplement the gap in financial services that traditional banks are
unable to address, by giving the poor access to innovative and mobile-based
payments, savings, credit, and insurance.
Such a possibility, however, may be tempered by the active implementation
of the DPA. The National Privacy Commission (‘NPC’), the privacy regulator, has
consistently adopted the strict European Union (‘EU’) standards of privacy,
specifically the ‘notice and consent’ system expressed in the GDPR. As various
financial technology (‘fintech’) services offered in the Philippines, from payment
and lending to online wealth management and crowdfunding, are well-positioned
to lead to financial inclusion, the DPA presents significant roadblocks that may
irreversibly impact the delivery.15 This paper argues that the DPA, particularly its
‘notice and consent’ regime, security measures, and stiff penalties, has a direct
8

Art Fuentes, The State of Financial Inclusion (or Exclusion) in PH, ABS-CBN Nᴇᴡꜱ (Aug. 3,
2018), https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/multimedia/infographic/08/03/18/the-state-of-financialinclusion-or-exclusion-in-ph [https://perma.cc/JCB6-6XJS].
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Jane K. Winn & Louis de Koker, Introduction to Mobile Money in Developing Countries:
Financial Inclusion and Integrity Conference Special Issue, 8 Wᴀꜱʜ. J. L. Tᴇᴄʜ. &
Aʀᴛꜱ 155, 156 (2013).
13
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Financial Inclusion in the Philippines (2018),
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/Publications/2018/FIP_1Sem2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AMU3-HE3K].
14
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Report on the State of Financial Inclusion in the Philippines
(2017), http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/Publications/2016/Financial%20Inclusion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SC3Q-ZT5K].
15
Fabian Szijarto, Digital Banking Overview in the Philippines 9, Fɪɴᴀꜱᴛʀᴀ (2017).
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impact on the delivery of digital financial services for financial inclusion.16 This
paper explores the extent by which the DPA’s framing of consent disrupts business
models, stifles the use of big data, and leads to unfair competition.17
Part II briefly discusses the development of privacy law in the Philippines,
from consistently drawing from U.S. jurisprudence to an abrupt pivot to the EUbased approach. This provides the context for the critique that follows in Part III: a
discussion of how the DPA disrupts the democratized digital financial services as
they are delivered, at present, prevents the use of Big Data and imposes barriers to
entry. This Part breaks down the effectiveness of the ‘notice and consent’ system.
Instead of asserting a privacy regime that may not be fit for purpose, Part IV closes
with a proposal to ensure that digital financial inclusion is achieved, with the
supervision of the BSP and with adequate privacy protections that are more
appropriate in the context of developing countries. To be clear, this paper does not
propose the wholesale disregard of privacy regulation, as there are perfectly valid
reasons for requiring them. Rather, this paper suggests a bottom-up approach to
privacy that addresses both financial inclusion and privacy regulation.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES

This section provides a brief overview of the development of privacy law
in the Philippines from an approach that consistently drew from the U.S. legal
system to a sudden pivot towards the EU approach with the passage of the DPA. It
then compares the similarities between the DPA and the GDPR. Highlighting this
sudden shift is important, considering that early digital financial services in the
Philippines, such as Smart Money and GCash, were offered at a time when the strict
privacy requirements of the DPA were not yet in effect. If both financial products
were invented today, justifying them to the NPC would have been an
insurmountable challenge.
A.

The Internal Tension of Privacy Law in the Philippines

The diverging approaches to privacy law are influenced by a democratic
society’s collective choice about the roles that the market, citizens, and government

16

See generally Aᴠɪ Gᴏʟᴅꜰᴀʀʙ & Cᴀᴛʜᴇʀɪɴᴇ Tᴜᴄᴋᴇʀ, Privacy and Innovation, 12 Iɴɴᴏᴠᴀᴛɪᴏɴ
Pᴏʟ’ʏ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Eᴄᴏɴ. 65, 67 (Vol. 12, 2012).
17
Douglas Randall & Jennifer Chein, 8 Key Approaches to Accelerate Financial Inclusion,
Pʀɪᴠᴀᴛᴇ Sᴇᴄᴛᴏʀ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ Bʟᴏɢ (Feb. 2, 2017), http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/8-keyapproaches-accelerate-financial-inclusion [https://perma.cc/JQ7R-T8CD].
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play.18 Liberal, market-based norms define the privacy regime in the U.S.19,
compared to socially-protective, rights-based privacy norms in the EU.20 The EU
model expresses privacy and data protection as rights that may be asserted against
illegal data collection practices of firms.21 The EU frames data privacy as anchored
in human rights, imposing on the government the obligation to ensure equal
bargaining terms between corporations and individuals; privacy protection thus
applies regardless of the purpose of processing.22
Unlike the EU, the U.S. takes a liberal, sector-based approach to privacy.23
Specifically, U.S. privacy law is couched as a right to personal autonomy, with
constitutional protections against state interference, and sector-specific privacy
legislation adopted on an ad hoc basis, based on laissez-faire economics.24 Indeed,
the U.S. and EU approaches have been moving further apart from each other,
following international decisions by the EU on information privacy and blockage
of data transfers to third party nations, culminating with the passage of GDPR.25
Prior to the enactment of the GDPR-like DPA, Philippine privacy law was
largely inspired by the U.S. conceptualization of privacy. Section 2 of the Bill of
Rights under the Philippine Constitution provides for the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, while Section 3 emphasizes the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence—rights that may be invoked against the
state.26
Pre-DPA privacy jurisprudence in the Philippines drew heavily from U.S.
decisions, starting with the Philippine Supreme Court case of Morfe v. Mutuc,
which dealt with the constitutionality of the requirement for public officers to
disclose their assets and liabilities, on the grounds that it violates due process.27 In
18

Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52
Sᴛᴀɴ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1315, 1370 (2000).
19
Id. at 1318.
20
Id.
21
Jᴀꜱᴍɪɴᴇ MᴄNᴇᴀʟʏ & Aɴɢᴇʟʏɴ Fʟᴏᴡᴇʀꜱ, Privacy in a Digital Networked World 203 (Sherali
Zeadally & Mohamad Badra eds., 2015).
22
Christopher Kuner, An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and
Prospects, 25 Cᴏᴍᴘ. L. & Sᴇᴄ. Rᴇᴠ. 307, 1347 (2009).
23
See Reidenberg, supra note 19, at 1342-50 (There is no omnibus privacy law in the U.S. e.g.
privacy regulations applicable to the health sector differ from the finance sector).
24
See id.
25
See Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures,
126 Hᴀʀᴠ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1966, 1966-67 (2013) (discussing growing differences between the EU and
U.S. privacy laws).
26
Cᴏɴꜱᴛ. (1987), art. III, §§ 2-3 (Phil.).
27
Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, 130 Phil. Rep. 415 (S.C., Jan. 31, 1968) (Phil.)
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its ruling, the Philippine Supreme Court quoted U.S. Justice Brandeis, who
characterized the right to be let alone as the “most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.”28 This is how the idea of various zones of
privacy created from certain fundamental rights was imported to the Philippine
legal system.29 In another Philippine Supreme Court case, Ople v. Torres, the Court
recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right guaranteed under the
Philippine Constitution.30 In striking down the measure involved, the Court
admonished that a national identification system is where “[t]he end of privacy
begins.”31 Pre-DPA privacy was traditionally asserted as a check and balance
against the state.32 Thus, prior to the DPA, the Philippines had consistently leaned
towards the U.S. approach to privacy law.
With the passage of the DPA, the Philippines finds itself in a unique, if not
confusing, position: the constitutional right to privacy is rooted in the laissez-faire
U.S. concept of privacy, whilst the DPA, with provisions analogous to the GDPR,
leans towards the opposing EU model. The DPA appears oblivious to this conflict
and offers no solution, leaving many questions unanswered. For one, what is now
the role of the government in upholding the right to privacy, when this right was
traditionally asserted against it? The right to privacy has historically been asserted
against government abuses and questionable government measures,33 which is
more consistent with the U.S. approach. With the DPA, the government, through
the NPC, is now expected to be the vanguard of privacy.34
As an omnibus privacy law, the DPA stands as an outlier that does not
conform to the historical development of privacy law in the Philippines. Its
inconsistency clashes with many digital financial services that have been around
even before the DPA, and prevents innovation that involves the processing of
personal data, as will be argued in this paper. With this inconsistency, justifying
the pedestal on which the DPA appears to be placed above financial inclusion is
difficult. There is a need to re-examine the DPA’s various provisions and its bases,
the Data Protection Directive, and GDPR, to understand how it is a regrettable

28

Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
Id. at n. 63 (discussing how the U.S. concept of zones of privacy stemming from the U.S. Bill of
Rights is analogous to extending those same protections under the Philippine Constitution).
30
See Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 354 Phil. Rep. 948 (S.C., July 23, 1998)(Phil.) (“the right
to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery”).
31
See Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 354 Phil. Rep. 948 (S.C., July 23, 1998)(Phil.).
32
See Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, 130 Phil. Rep. 415 (S.C., Jan. 31, 1968)(Phil.).
33
See, e.g., id.
34
V. Pitogo, National Gov. Agency’s Compl. on Data Privacy Act of 2012: A Case Study, Phys.:
Conf. Ser. 1201 012021 (2019) (summarizing history of privacy laws in the Philippines).
29
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obstacle to digital financial inclusion.35 This is discussed in the following subsection.
B.

DPA’s Replication of the EU Approach

DPA was passed supposedly because of the lack of a data protection law
hindered the development of the business processing outsourcing (‘BPO’)
industry.36 The DPA mirrored several provisions of the Data Protection Directive.
Then, the GDPR replaced the Data Protection Directive with twice as many
provisions. One of the reasons for updating the Data Protection Directive with the
more exhaustive GDPR is a supposed need to institute more rigid protective
measures in light of emerging technologies, such as cloud computing, Big Data,
and the Internet of Things (“IoT”).37 A specific concern is how consent
requirements under the Data Protection Directive have been used by companies on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis, where customers must consent to the service or be
blocked from using it altogether.38
With the enactment of the GDPR, the NPC has actively sought to show that
it aligns with the DPA’s provisions. As noted by a previous Deputy Commissioner
of the NPC, compliance with the DPA would equate to 90% compliance with the
GDPR.39 In its newsletter, the NPC set out the similarities between the two:

Consent

GDPR

DPA

Consent must be freely given,
specific, informed, and
unambiguous indication of the
data subject’s agreement to the
processing. This is indicated

Consent must be freely given,
specific, informed indication of
will that the data subject agrees
to the processing of personal
data. This is evidenced by

35

See Lyman & Lauer, supra note 6 (defining digital financial inclusion as, “digital access to and
use of formal financial services by excluded and underserved populations”).
36
Gʀᴀʜᴀᴍ Gʀᴇᴇɴʟᴇᴀꜰ, Asian Data Privacy Laws: Trade & Human Rights Perspectives 342
(2014).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Damian Mapa, Mapping the Philippine Data Privacy Act and GDPR: A White Paper from the
EITSC, Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Iɴɴᴏᴠᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, Tᴇᴄʜ., ᴀɴᴅ Sᴄɪ. Cᴛʀ. Fᴏᴜɴᴅ. 1 (2018), https://eitsc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/Mapping-the-DPA-and-GDPR.pdf.
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through a statement of clear
affirmative action. 40

written, electronic or recorded
means.41

Consent, necessary for the
fulfillment of a contractual
arrangement, compliance with a
Criteria
legal obligation, protection of
for Lawful vital interests, public of the
Processing processor, public
interest/exercise of official
authority, or legitimate
interest.42

For the processing of personal
information: consent, necessary
for the fulfillment of a
contractual arrangement,
compliance with a legal
obligation of the processor,
protection of vital interests,
public interest/exercise of
public authority, or legitimate
interest.43

Controllers must implement
appropriate technical and
organizational measures to
demonstrate GDPR
compliance, and build in
privacy by default and design.44
They must also undertake
compulsory data protection
impact assessments, 45 and
appoint data protection
officers.46

Controllers and processors47
must implement organizational,
physical and technical security
measures.48 Privacy impact
assessments must be
undertaken for programs or
processes that involve the
personal data.49 A data
protection officer must also be
appointed.50

Security
Measures

40

Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Uɴɪᴏɴ, Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ 2016/679 ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Pᴀʀʟɪᴀᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ
Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏꜰ 27 Aᴜɢᴜꜱᴛ 2016: Gᴇɴᴇʀᴀʟ Dᴀᴛᴀ Pʀᴏᴛᴇᴄᴛɪᴏɴ Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ [hereinafter GDPR]; GDPR
art. 4(11).
41
CONGRESS OF THE PHIL., REPUBLIC OF PHIL. Rᴇᴘ. Aᴄᴛ Nᴏ. 10173: Dᴀᴛᴀ Pʀɪᴠᴀᴄʏ Aᴄᴛ ᴏꜰ 2012
[hereinafter DPA]; DPA § 3(b).
42
GDPR Recital 39-52, art. 6.
43
See DPA § 12.
44
GDPR art. 5(2), 24, 25.
45
Id. art. 35.
46
Id. art. 37.
47
DPA § 3(i) (referring a processor as "any natural or juridical person qualified to act as such
under this Act to whom a personal information controller may outsource the processing of
personal data pertaining to a data subject").
48
Id. § 20.
49
Id.
50
DPA § 21(b).
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Sanctions
and
Penalties

Administrative fines of up to 20 Fine of up to PhP 2,000,000 and
million euros or 4% of annual
imprisonment of up to seven
51
worldwide turnover.
years.52

The GDPR and the DPA share many other similarities, but the above
provisions are singled out, specifically because they are relevant in analyzing the
impact of the DPA on the delivery of digital financial services. In fact, the DPA is
more punitive, with the potential of imprisonment of up to seven years.53
The NPC is empowered by the DPA to issue advisory opinions based on
inquiries by the public.54 The NPC has used this power to further align itself with
GDPR. There are a number of NPC opinions that directly affect the delivery of
digital financial services. To start with, the NPC expressly stated that the DPA
applies to companies in the financial sector that are engaged in processing personal
data.55 The regulator has also expressly qualified certain standard practices in the
financial services industry as falling within the scope of the DPA, such as mobile
phone data shared for credit scoring,56 anonymized statistical data,57 and data
shared between entities.58
Perhaps one of the more significant interpretations of the DPA involved
consent: the NPC has certain terms that set opt-in consent as the baseline standard
when processing is based on consent, ruling out the possibility of using implied,

51

GDPR art. 83.
DPA §§ 25-37.
53
Id. § 28.
54
Id. § 7.
55
PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO.
2017-23 (June 21, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wpcontent/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-023.pdf.
56
PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO.
2017-31 (June 28, 2017) (holding that while the DPA does not apply to truly anonymous
information, it must prevent the possibility of identification of the data subject. As discussed in the
next section, technological advancements puts effective anonymisation solutions at a permanent
state of uncertainty), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wpcontent/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-031.pdf.
57
PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO.
2017-27 (June 23, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wpcontent/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-027.pdf.
58
PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO.
2017-13 (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wpcontent/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-013.pdf.
52
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passive, or opt-out consent.59 In interpreting the requirement of consent, the NPC
has on at least two occasions in to adopted the GDPR interpretation that consent
must be a freely given, specific, informed and ambiguous—clearly indicating the
data subject’s acceptance of the processing by the controller; silence, pre-ticked
boxes, or inactivity do not meet this criterion.60 While controllers theoretically need
not limit themselves to consent, as there are other criteria for processing personal
data that may be relied upon, the NPC considers consent as the most reliable if not
unassailable criterion. Responding to a question on whether an entity providing
credit scores based on mobile phone data is covered by the DPA, the NPC
unsurprisingly answered in the affirmative, then went one step further by stating
that the processing activity requires consent.61 Consent is likewise the criterion for
data sharing, even among affiliates.62 Based on these opinions, the NPC has exerted
an active effort to set ‘notice and consent’ as the ideal standard for processing.
The above opinions, which frame consent as the ideal standard for data
processing, come at a time when several studies have critiqued overreliance on
‘notice and consent’ as a standard for data processing,63 and this, in particular, is
examined more closely in the next section. Moreover, by expressly citing the
GDPR, the NPC has shown its proclivity for transplanting the GDPR into the
Philippine context as shown in Part III below. This policy direction has far-reaching
implications on the delivery of digital financial services geared towards financial
inclusion.
III.

THE IMPACT OF REPLICATED GDPR STANDARDS ON THE DELIVERY OF
DIGITAL FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION

59

PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO.
2017-23 (June 21, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wpcontent/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-023.pdf.
60
PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO.
2017-53 (Sep. 11, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wpcontent/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-053.pdf; PRIVACY POLICY
OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO. 2017-42 (Aug. 14,
2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wpcontent/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-042.pdf.
61
PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO.
2017-31 (June 28, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wpcontent/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-031.pdf.
62
PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, IᴍᴘʟᴇᴍᴇɴᴛIɴɢ Rᴜʟᴇꜱ ᴀɴᴅ
RᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛIᴏɴꜱ ᴏꜰ RᴇᴘᴜʙʟIᴄ Aᴄᴛ Nᴏ. 10173 § 20 (Aug. 24, 2016).
63
Eugenia Politou, Efthimios Alepis & Constantinos Patsakis, Forgetting Personal Data and
Revoking Consent under the GDPR: Challenges and Proposed Solutions, 4 J. Cʏʙᴇʀꜱᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ 20,
5 (2018).

60

Having discussed the transplantation of the EU-based privacy regime, this
Part discusses how the current privacy regime, specifically the system of ‘notice
and consent’ drawn from the Data Protection Directive and interpreted in
accordance with the GDPR, may negatively impact the delivery of digital financial
services and may impede the common goal of financial inclusion. Innovations in
digital financial services have been making strides towards financial inclusion by
enabling the poor to make financial transactions, empowering them to have formal
saving channels, and increasing their ability to partake in profit-enhancing
activities. With the DPA, such financial services may violate the ‘notice and
consent’ system in place, among other provisions.64
This Part is divided as follows: first, it maps the link between digital
financial inclusion and innovation in fintech. Second, it discusses the problems that
scholars have identified with the ‘notice and consent’ system transplanted from the
EU. The third subsection more thoroughly illustrates possible DPA violations
inherent in the current business model of digital financial services in the
Philippines. Such services primarily rely on branchless banking, which was legal
in the pre-DPA privacy era. The fourth sub-section analyzes how the DPA's ‘notice
and consent’ system prevents the use of Big Data, which is integral for the
innovation of financial processes. The fifth sub-section discusses how the DPA
discourages competition and, as a corollary, encourages monopolies.
Innovation in digital financial services usually takes the form of fintech
products—services that offer credit, provide financial advice, manage assets, and
facilitate mobile money transactions.65 A key concept that ties the discussions
below together, and is important to remember, is how innovation has helped reduce
poverty through inexpensive and efficient financial services—enabling the poor to
make mobile payments, gain access to savings, and increase their ability to partake
in profit-enhancing activities—all of which seem simple but provide a crucial
financial lifeline to the unbanked.66
A.

The Dilemma of Financial Exclusion

While providing access to financial services may seem like a
straightforward process, developing countries like the Philippines have struggled
64
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with financial inclusion for decades. The population of the Philippines is 101
million people,67 of which 53% live in rural areas68 and 21.6% live below the
national poverty level. Among the Filipinos who are employed, only 8.3% have the
purchasing power of $.190 daily.69 The underserved segment is primarily
comprised of two groups in poverty: the unbanked who do not have any relationship
with financial institutions and the underbanked who have a basic but insufficient
relationship with financial institutions.70 Reaching this segment of the population
has been a Sisyphean task for banks. These groups are not only financially illiterate,
but many live in remote areas where bank branches are financially unsustainable.
They do not have enough money to avoid transacting through the formal banking
system that would result in higher transaction costs than those paid by an average
person. Even worse, they have no credit history that can help determine their
creditworthiness for lower interest rates.71 The list of challenges goes on and
accurately illustrates the effect of lacking access to basic necessities like a bank
account.72
The solution to reaching the underserved segment lies in innovation: first
by breaking down the complex causes of financial exclusion to their elemental
components, finding inventive solutions for each identified problem, and then
testing each solution in the market for efficacy.73 In this regard, mobile phones have
proven to be a powerful means to deliver financial services to achieve financial
inclusion.74 With 59% of the population owning a smartphone and 55.5% using the
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Internet,75 the Philippines could use smartphones and the Internet as a viable,
effective, and inexpensive means for delivering financial services to the poor.76 As
key components driving the digital financial inclusion,77 the evidence that mobile
phones can improve access to financial services is by no means anecdotal. When
governments cannot invest in the complex banking infrastructure and banks deem
such investment as financially unsound, digital financial service has emerged as a
viable alternative to include the underserved population into the financial system in
countries that have high mobile phone penetration.78 Considering the advantages of
digital financial services concerns about how policy decisions (in this case, the
DPA) can affect the trajectory of fintech are well-founded.79
Financial inclusion measures access to four types of financial services:
credit, savings (including current accounts), payments, and insurance.80 There are
many examples of fintech bridging the gap towards financial inclusion. How the
DPA affects innovation in these four types of financial services is discussed in the
subsequent sections.
B.

DPA’s Problematic Framing of Consent

This section analyzes the ‘notice and consent’ standard of processing under
the DPA, imported from the EU-based approach. As discussed in Part II, the ‘notice
and consent’ system under the DPA, as interpreted by the NPC, copies the language
and interpretation of the GDPR.
Copying the EU-based privacy approach may be incompatible with
innovation81, as reflected in the so-called “European Paradox”—the contrast
between the EU’s reputable academic position vis-à-vis its relative weakness in
75
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innovation.82 The Internet market illustrates the phenomenon: not only has the EU
failed to become a leader in this field, but it also has not been noticeable.83 This
was not always the case as EU-based companies had the first-mover advantage in
information and communication technologies. However, the EU privacy regime
became increasingly strict and U.S.-based Internet juggernauts like Google,
Facebook, Amazon, and Twitter took over the market.84 In the data-driven market
as the Internet, the EU-based model, which emphasized ‘notice and consent’ from
its inception, may have failed to take into account that “regulation could preclude
economic and societal benefits.”85 While factors other than privacy also led to this
contrast, the United-States-based privacy approach facilitates the flow of
information necessary to fuel the information economy of the Internet. The U.S.
model is consistent with the idea that as long as consumer protection mechanisms
and security concerns are in place, personal data is a useful tool that can promote
innovation.86 In fact, the pre-DPA privacy law in the Philippines followed the U.S.
model, allowing the invention of mobile money systems and e-money in an
environment relatively unencumbered by regulation.87
Upon the implementation of the DPA, consent became the preferred
standard of processing and the dominant mechanism in some parts of the modern
world.88 This approach, as required by the GDPR and replicated by the NPC,
intuitively makes sense, as it empowers individuals to exercise their privacy
rights.89 However, the ‘notice and consent’ system is replete with assumptions and
anachronisms at the expense of financial inclusion in the long run.90 The
82
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requirement of consent assumes that consumers read written privacy policies in the
first place and therefore, can give meaningful consent.91 The truth could not be
further removed from this assumption—the forms contain too much legalese;92 they
are too time-consuming to read; resistance to giving consent is futile;93 or,
electronic contracts just do not have the same compelling force as paper contracts.94
The reality is that consumers simply do not pay attention when consenting to
privacy policies.95 While the DPA makes an extensive enumeration of the rights of
a data subject, as well as the risks of privacy violations, consumers simply do not
have the expertise and information to sift through a privacy policy and make an
informed choice.96 This is the so-called transparency paradox: even the most
sophisticated users would be confounded by the impact of information practices
relating to their personal data.97 Thus, the ‘notice and consent’ system forces
individuals to make a binary choice—based on a complex number of factors they
do not even realize or are not aware of, to begin with—regarding their privacy.98
The reality of a consumer’s modern commercial life is that to avail of a
service, there is no choice but to tick the consent box—and all other alternative
services impose the same condition.99 Privacy has certainly not been identified as a
reason to refuse service. Moreover, the transparency paradox has found its way to
the Philippines, as the active implementation of the DPA has resulted in the
ubiquity of privacy policies that need to be expressly agreed to before a service is
provided.100 At best, the barrage of these tick boxes is an unwelcome interruption
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to a consumer’s online life.101 At worst, it is a grim reminder that resistance is futile,
and the consumer really has no choice but to agree.102
A perspective to consider is that the consumer intuitively welcomes
information sharing in certain cases or for a certain price.103 Indeed, if privacy is so
important to one’s dignity, then people would not be giving away tidbits of their
personal lives on social media or discarding it away to participate in promotional
advertisements.104 Also, while people value privacy, they are actually willing to
disclose sensitive information about themselves for just a small price, like a chance
to win in a raffle contest.105 That Filipinos are on top when it comes to social media
usage for the third year in a row—spending almost four hours a day on average—
speaks to this notion.106 Moreover, consumers may want to have their data profiled,
so they can receive targeted information about the services they may be of
interest.107
The question of how the extensively criticized ‘notice and consent’ system
impacts innovation, especially in financial services, is therefore important to
consider. The attempt to frame consent as a matter of individual choice is a barrier
to necessary research that could lead to innovation.108 ‘Notice and consent’ systems
impede data flows,109 resulting in a restrictive environment that prevents the
processing of personal data to experiment with innovative financial solutions.
Experimentation would entail reverting to the individual multiple times to obtain
their consent—a task too costly to undertake, and is therefore unlikely to be allowed
by firms.110 The DPA’s ‘notice and consent’ system has been interpreted by the
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NPC so rigidly (in that it can only be opt-in)111 and at the same time so broadly (in
that it can apply to all situations that remotely have a data processing component)112
that what should be a peripheral concern turns into a major red flag for financial
innovation.113 With its power to prosecute for imprisonment and sanction standard
financial services industry practices through its opinions,114 the NPC is generating
false positives: characterizing present and future business models as in breach of
the ‘notice and consent’ system, when, as discussed in this subsection, this standard
is problematic in the first place. Moreover, certain industry practices, which were
in place pre-DPA, are normatively acceptable, at least in the Philippines.115
A study commissioned by the NPC showed that 94% of Filipino adults want
to understand how their personal data is used in transactions and that 85% believe
that the rights of data subjects are important.116 This should not give the privacy
regulator the blanket authority to impose ‘notice and consent’ as the ideal standard
for processing. Instead, it should provide the impetus for the NPC to conduct
information awareness campaigns. A more reasoned approach, which is discussed
in more detail in Part IV below, is for the NPC to adopt an innovation-friendly
stance, protecting core privacy values and recognizing its role in the delivery of
digital financial services.117 For a country that is only beginning to understand
privacy regulation, this seems more plausible than the current activist stand of the
NPC in its bid to set “higher bars for compliance standards in the Asia-Pacific
region.”118
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C.

DPA Disrupting Current Business Models

The story of digital financial inclusion in developing countries commonly
begins with mobile payments.119 In no other area has fintech played a greater role
in promoting financial inclusion than in the area of mobile payments.120 The ‘fuel’
of mobile payments systems is mobile money—electronic money that allows users
to store, send, and receive money in a mobile phone-based account.121
If a mobile phone is a powerful tool for the underserved to gain access to
financial services, retail agents serve as the infrastructure for facilitating this
access.122 Filling the gap left by the lack of brick-and-mortar banks, retail agents
serve as the communication points for customers to use their mobile phones to store
e-money, to make money transfers, and to withdraw cash from their mobile-based
account.123 This is known as branchless banking, the reliance on non-bank outlets
such as retail stores, grocery shops, lottery outlets, gas stations, and fertilizer stores,
instead of brick-and-mortar banks, to provide financial services.124 Under this
model, the agent (who is often the cashier of the store) performs the traditional
banking role by settling transactions with the customer.125 Through these low-cost
delivery channels, underserved people can reliably access financial services,
increasing financial inclusion,126 with little delay,127 and minimal transaction
costs.128 Kenya’s M-Pesa, widely considered one of the most successful case
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studies for mobile payments, has a ratio of 48.46 active agents per 10,000 adults129
and over 12 million users since its 2007 launch.130
The Philippines is the pioneer in mobile payments, with the launch of Smart
Money in 2001131 and GCash in 2004.132 Operated by the two telecommunications
(‘telco’) operators in the Philippines, their services allow subscribers to facilitate
money remittances, pay bills, and avail of products and services via SMS. In the
Philippines, these services are commonplace in sari-sari stores: small
neighborhood retail shops that sell basic commodities such as instant noodles,
canned food, and candy chips.133 These stores serve as access points for senders to
transact, deposit and withdraw money with their mobile accounts.134 Mobile money
may even be used to pay for sari-sari store goods.135 As a country with over 7,500
islands, bank branches present in only 50% of these islands, and 36% of
municipalities without a bank branch, the value that branchless banking brings is
significant.136
A vibrant mobile payments market is just an entry point for providing other
financial services crucial to financial inclusion: savings, credit, and insurance.137
Aside from enabling money transfers digitally, mobile payments serve as a reliable
way of saving cash, albeit without earning interest.138 As for credit, mobile payment
systems serve as viable channels for making loan payments.139 A subscriber’s data
history can also serve as a way of building data history that potential lenders can
use to assess credit risk.140 Mobile microfinance, which allows smartphone users to
129
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borrow money after an evaluation of their mobile phone data (from their call usage
to their bill payments),141 promises better accountability, lower transaction costs,
flexibility, and transparency.142 With mobile microfinance, the underserved are
given the opportunity to engage in entrepreneurial activity.143 Several credit-related
initiatives have already been introduced in the Philippines: Lenddo for nonconventional credit scoring, GoodKredit for disbursing short-term consumer loans,
Loansolutions.ph as a P2P lending marketplace,144 and Lendr as a loans
management platform.145 Lastly, for insurance, mobile payment systems can serve
as a channel for providing insurance. This is possible through partnerships between
telco operators that serve as customer-facing distribution channels and commercial
insurers who remain risk carriers. Together, they enter into outsourcing
arrangements, where practically all but underwriting risks are outsourced to the
telco operators.146 The last metric of financial inclusion, insurance, is particularly
important for the poor, who face major risks, yet are unfortunately the least likely
to buy insurance products.147 For example, weather risk is a major problem farmers
face, and index-based weather insurance, with payouts triggered upon certain
weather measurements, allows them to take on risks with their farming choices that
result in better yield.148
Quite unsurprisingly, data processing is involved in facilitating mobile
payment systems, and delivering savings, credit, and insurance to the underserved.
Mobile payment systems work because consumers only need to comply with
rudimentary identification requirements when going to a sari-sari store. The DPA
turns this approach on its head by requiring consent to be in written form, evidenced
through electronic or recorded means.149 If the DPA were applied as intended, opthttps://globalfindex.worldbank.org/sites/globalfindex/files/201804/2017%20Findex%20full%20report_0.pdf.
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in consent would apply to every transaction. Quite simply, the DPA attempts to fix
a system that is not broken and that has worked for the poor in far-flung and
poverty-stricken areas in developing countries for several years now. Not only
would the DPA’s new requirement be impractical, but it would also unnecessarily
complicate an otherwise straightforward and painless transaction between the retail
agent and the subscriber. The consequences are grave, as violations may lead to
hefty penalties and even imprisonment. The problem that the DPA tries to address
by embedding a ‘notice and consent’ mechanism in such a transaction is not clear:
in the Philippines, there has so far been no identified risks or reported privacy
violations arising from mobile payments transactions of this kind.
Moreover, the cost of complying with the GDPR is estimated to be
US$50,000 for small businesses with less than nine employees.150 Considering the
similarities between the GDPR and the DPA, this is money that sari-sari stores
simply do not have. For a simple store selling basic commodities with little more
than a few hundred dollars of gross earnings in a month, the requirements the DPA
impose are not only burdensome but also risky considering the penalties under the
DPA.
Another characteristic of the financial services industry is the use of data as
a currency for providing customized benefits and personalized products.151 The
value of processing personal data in delivering such financial services to the poor
is apparent. By using Big Data and artificial intelligence, financial providers can
arrive at superior and more reliable data to assess the actual credit-worthiness of an
individual,152 reducing information asymmetry that has made it hard for traditional
lenders to provide similar services to the underserved.153 Investors, lenders, and
financial institutions use these technologies, generating relevant datasets after being
fed vast amounts of raw data, to provide credit at a lower cost and in a more
accessible manner.154 The free flow of information is necessary to assess credit risk,
to deliver mobile microfinance, and to establish insurance partnerships.
Partnerships that allow service providers to share datasets among themselves, to
150
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come up with fresh insights, are integral to financial inclusion.155 Many datasets
necessary for delivering digital financial services involve linking various datasets
to find new insights.156 The ‘notice and consent’ system would require renewed
consent every time information systems are activated to deliver digital financial
services—an impractical and costly requirement that will significantly drive up
their costs and result in unreasonable delay.157
D.

DPA Stopping Big Data in its Tracks

Referring to the use of increasingly sophisticated algorithms to aggregate
and classify otherwise unobservable patterns, trends, and behaviors of individuals
or consumer segments,158 Big Data can arrive at highly complex datasets filtered
from various sources, including a person’s cookies, social networking activities,
online transactions, mobile phone usage, and email exchanges.159 Big Data is made
more powerful by modern devices, such as wearables and smart appliances, that
actively process personal data and communicate them to a service provider—the
so-called IoT.
Interoperability, a characteristic of big data that entails the sharing of
datasets of personal information among service providers,160 is a key element in
extending digital financial services to the poor.161 Such datasets may be obtained
from data on a user’s mobile device, call and text history, use of value-added
services, Internet usage, and financial transaction data.162 With this resource
businesses can create a more accurate profile of their consumers, allowing them to
identify consumer needs and deliver more relevant financial products and
services163 with better pricing options.164 Moreover, partnerships among providers
are more easily formed as common needs and goals are identified.165 Big Data
likewise allows firms to engage in targeted marketing, the use of processed data to
deliver advertisements that match consumers’ needs and interests.166 Recommender
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systems, which offer custom recommendations based on previous purchasing
decisions, are another by-product.167 All these result in lower operating costs for
the service provider that may lead to low-cost services for the underserved168 and
more useful information for consumers tailored to their interests.169
This is the modern world we live in. Current data collection practices are a
complex ecosystem of various players—from profilers and advertising agencies to
advertisement purchasers and websites that post advertisements. These players
simultaneously retain, analyze, and distribute personal data in various,
unpredictable ways. A single processor simply cannot predict or describe in
sufficient detail how specific data is being utilized.170 In the context of Big Data,
the value of personal data is not immediately apparent at the point of collection.171
Insights that may lead to innovation are realized only after datasets are combined,
tested, or used in the market, in an open environment.172 Calling this interlocking
system abusive is an oversimplification, as it has enabled commercialism and
financial inclusion,173 leading to many innovations in the digital economy.174
Big Data is a game-changer for financial inclusion. Several mobile financial
applications are underpinned by interoperable identity management systems.175 An
example is M-Pesa. From its use as a mobile payments system, M-Pesa utilized its
massive datasets of personal data, partnered with financial institutions, and
expanded into offering accessible and cost-efficient savings and credit for the
poor.176 Big Data also makes possible the creation of niche financial products that
would otherwise be too risky to put out in the market,177 like providing emergency
funds where other fund sources are unavailable.178 To democratize access to
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credit,179 a person’s transaction history, mobile wallet use, and subscriber tenure
can be used to assess creditworthiness, especially for people who have no credit
history with a bank.180 Known as algorithmic lending 2.0, firms are increasingly
turning to expanded volumes of data and machine learning to analyze data, then
feeding the results into credit-scoring algorithms, to arrive at a more accurate risk
profile of a person.181 The same footprints can also be used to offer them insurance
products with custom features and modified payment schemes.182
The realities of Big Data are incompatible with the ‘notice and consent’
system of the DPA, as the use of personal data cannot be readily ascertained and
only becomes apparent after novel connections among datasets are made, in an
environment of open creativity.183 This is the same environment in which
algorithmic lending is deemed permissible. Thus, obtaining informed consent at the
time of collection (where it is usually given) is simply antithetical to the open-ended
nature of Big Data.184 Where the DPA errs is in its assumption that data controllers
process tidbits of personal data at a time, when the reality of Big Data is that
multiple processors, and combined datasets from various sources, are involved at
any given point in time.185 The DPA discounts the fact that processors cannot, in
principle, obtain informed consent because Big Data assumes that raw data is in
itself meaningless and purposeless until combined with other datasets, analyzed for
its significance, and then used to come up with creatively designed digital financial
services.186 In this complex ecosystem, there is no clear processor, and the datasets
are not located in a single repository at any given time.187 Privacy harms, when they
do happen, are an effect of aggregation of personal data over time by various
entities, and pinning the blame on a single entity is erroneous.188 The IoT involves
an overlap of interconnected devices and systems collecting and processing
personal data in a continuous loop, therefore, applying the DPA means that consent
would have to be obtained ceaselessly as well.
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E.

DPA’s Anticompetitive Effect

This sub-section discusses the link between privacy regulation and
competition in financial services.189 The recent enactment of the Philippine
Competition Act190 highlights the government policy to promote unencumbered
market competition in the interest of consumers, encourage an entrepreneurial
spirit, facilitate technology development, and enhance resource productivity.191
Companies engaged in data-intensive operations thrive because of economies of
scale and network effects.192 In the Philippines, the most popular digital financial
services are operated by duopolistic telco operators. While one may superficially
conclude that the DPA decreases the tendencies of monopolization by curbing datamining practices, the opposite rings true. The DPA actually encourages
monopolies, to the exclusion of resource-strapped smaller players.193
The DPA applies to the data processing activities of a processor, regardless
of its size and scale. Both dominant financial service providers and startups have to
comply with the DPA. This is a costly undertaking that requires organizations,
among other things, to invest in IT systems, conduct audits, hire data protection
specialists, seek extensive legal advice, amend and renegotiate contracts, and
undertake technical and organizational measures.194 Small Philippine startups
already lack capital, meaning that any privacy-related costs, if by the company, will
likely be passed on to the consumer.
This uniform treatment results in a disproportionate and unlevelled playing
field. Established financial service providers are more capable of persuading
consumers to give up consent, simply because they have more to offer than
SMEs.195 Consumers are likely to trust entrenched brands and continue using their
services, instead of new entrants who have not proven their value.196 This will allow
dominant players to maintain their position in the market, as they continue to collect
and process personal data with relatively few roadblocks. With access to their
consumer data, established service providers can afford investing in behavioral
189
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targeting techniques that avoid the application of the DPA,197 while SMEs do not
have the same resources to invest in equally expensive techniques. SMEs can only
rely on accessible personal data (that the DPA now prohibits) to provide innovative
financial services. Because consumer data is not as easily accessible for SMEs, they
cannot understand consumer behavior as well as the bigger players can,198 resulting
in additional barriers to entry and ineffective financial services. New Zealand is an
illustrative example: its strict credit card reporting regime resulted in only a few
banks being able to issue credit cards as the prohibitive costs and restrictive
requirements prevented smaller firms from engaging in data-related activities as
simple as running credit card checks on applicants.199
To bring the example closer to the Philippines, the two leading mobile
payment services providers, Smart Money and GCash, dominate the mobile
payments market and are provided by the only two telco operators in the
telecommunications industry.200 With only 1.3% of the Filipino population having
an electronic money account201 and although the Philippines pioneered the digital
payments industry, the DPA will only further entrench these dominant players in
the industry. They will not only have access to customer data, but also the resources
needed to target consumers, invest in behavioral targeting techniques, and comply
with the burdensome requirements of the DPA. Because the DPA imposes equally
strict requirements on both dominant players and new entrants and exposes them to
unreasonable risks, SMEs have to consider all these costs, aside from their main
task of actually creating innovative financial services.

IV.

A VIABLE PROPOSITION TO PRIVACY REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES

The Philippine central bank has declared financial inclusion as one of its
goals, recognizing how sustainable, secure, and affordable financial services can be
delivered in a digital finance ecosystem.202 In its report, the BSP has identified
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three pillars to achieve this: (1) a retail payment system that allows even smallvalue transactions, (2) a network of affordable touchpoints for clients to be onboard
users, and (3) convenient access to an account that will allow the poor to open and
use digital financial services.203 As shown in Parts III(C) and (D), digital financial
services can provide support for these three pillars. Also, a recent conference in the
Philippines showcased the various local fintech initiatives that can potentially drive
financial inclusion across the country.204 The central bank has thus far demonstrated
the right attitude, with an understanding of how digital financial inclusion can lead
to economic empowerment and poverty reduction.205 As argued in this paper, the
NPC’s consent framework may derail the possible gains in digital financial
inclusion.
This Part discusses an approach that will support the trajectory of innovation
for financial inclusion, without disregarding the importance of privacy. By framing
privacy risks as a consumer protection issue, actual privacy problems relating to
transparency and fair treatment are addressed.
A.

Maintaining the Test-and-Learn, Industry-Based Approach to
Financial Regulation

The ladder to the success of financial innovation that leads to financial
inclusion is not prudential and proactive regulation, but a regulatory policy that
enables service providers to engage in prudent behavior.206 Thus far, the ideal
regulatory formula for digital financial inclusion is for regulators to maintain a
healthy distance and to work closely with service providers, to develop custom-fit
regulations consistent with international standards.207 Service providers must be
given enough legroom to experiment and fine-tune their digital financial services—
regulatory intervention should only be introduced as flagged issues start to
materialize and risks (including privacy-related ones) become clear.208
The BSP has believed in this approach since the start. When telco operators
in the Philippines started offering their mobile payment services, the BSP agreed to
accord them the status of a remittance agent, instead of a deposit-taker, substantially
203
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lessening their need to comply with burdensome banking regulations.209 Later, the
BSP issued its e-money regulation,210 notable for ensuring that the playing field
between banks and nonbanks are equal.211 Intending to promote financial inclusion,
the regulation arose from the BSP’s test-and-learn approach.212
To complement this approach, the regulator should emphasize and foster
multi-sectoral cooperation. Dominant players, telco operators, startups, investors,
and retail agents must be given adequate representation and a forum to ensure that
digital financial inclusion is achieved whilst addressing actual data privacy risks,
and not imagined ones.213 This will foster an environment that facilitates open
dialogue on the best data processing practices for digital financial inclusion, instead
of the tendency towards strict privacy rules, like DPA, that require controllers to
comply with privacy rules on paper without truly understanding the essence of
privacy protection.214 Moreover, an open environment will force industry players,
including the NPC, to reexamine the ‘notice and consent’ system.
Entities engaged in data processing themselves recognize that they are in
the best position to standardize data protection practices and to balance privacy with
the free flow of information necessary for innovation.215 By giving the financial
services market the responsibility of setting professional standards and ethical
market conduct concerning privacy, the end product is a privacy framework that is
fit for its purpose,216 and does not rely on ‘notice and consent’ as a mere formality
and a way of abrogating responsibility.217 A culture of institutional accountability
is thus created.218 To be clear, the BSP’s powers are not diminished; it merely gives
the market the flexibility and accountability it needs to develop viable financial
solutions.219
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This proposed liberalized approach marks a return to form. As previously
discussed in Part II(A) of this paper, the Philippines had consistently followed the
market-based, sector-specific approach to privacy, until suddenly pivoting to the
EU-based model. If the DPA was enacted because the lack of a data privacy law
might hinder the growth of the outsourcing sector,220 perhaps the Philippine
legislature should have enacted a BPO sector-specific privacy legislation instead,
consistent with the US approach. Moreover, a market-based approach would give
the market the leg room it needs to rectify recurring privacy-related problems.
Identity theft, for example, can be minimized by biometric technologies such as
facial recognition technology.221 Privacy-Enhancing Technologies, such as
encryption techniques and certain data analytic and management tools, were
engineered by the private sector well before the GDPR—and are continuously
improving, regardless of what the privacy law may require.222 Better algorithms are
being designed to prevent algorithmic discrimination.223 These just show that, even
without strict privacy regulation, the industry is aware of the commercial
importance of privacy.
B.

Going Back to Basics by Generating Privacy Awareness

Whilst financial inclusion is important, this does not mean that privacy is
not important for the underserved.224 Big Data can be used for price discrimination
and identity theft.225 Digital financial services may be used to commit financial
crimes, like money laundering and terrorist financing.226
The solution to privacy violations is not a ‘notice and consent’ regime. As
discussed in this paper, it forces individuals to make a responsible choice,227
without achieving its purported goal of protecting information privacy.228 Instead,
this paper advocates for a bottom-up approach. Before providing sweeping
regulation that can affect how entire industries operate, it makes sense to generate
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more public awareness about privacy issues and the benefits and risks of the
processing of their personal data.229
While unappealing and rudimentary, the solution necessitates going back to
basics—first, by increasing public awareness of privacy issues.230 General
awareness campaigns must be conducted with a twofold purpose: to promote digital
financial literacy and to uphold transparency concerning the relevance of data
processing in the delivery of digital financial services.231 Equipping Filipinos with
digital financial literacy will not only give them access to crucial financial services,
but it will also give them a concrete picture of how their personal data is used.232 A
campaign that highlights both digital financial services and the privacy concerns
they pose will address the goals of financial inclusion, without dismissing the data
privacy angle.233 The net result is financially literate Filipinos who have a
meaningful understanding of how their Internet behavior and mobile phone usage,
interacts with privacy.
Transparency in data processing practices, instead of ‘notice and consent’,
must be the key focus in disseminating awareness. Transparency regarding the
various processors in the information-sharing ecosystem and the lawful uses of
personal data is a more reasonable obligation to impose on financial providers at
this point, than the burdensome compliance costs of ‘notice and consent’.234 Only
after genuinely providing the foundation for privacy awareness can a credible
sector-specific privacy regulation that balances financial inclusion and privacy
concerns be in place.

C.

Reframing Privacy as a Consumer Protection Issue

While generating privacy awareness is important, the question of where
privacy fits in the regulation of digital financial services remains unanswered. In
this regard, this article proposes that privacy must be approached as a matter of
consumer regulation.235 Regulation can be designed in proportion to the risks posed
to a consumer of digital financial services.236Applying regulations as proportionate
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measures compared to the risks requires the private sector and regulators to
collaborate and research to arrive at a common understanding of how digital
financial services interact with consumers.237 This may require more
experimentation and processing of personal data—which a ‘notice and consent’
regime does not endorse.
In framing privacy as a consumer protection issue, the question needs to be
asked: to what extent should privacy violations be considered consumer protection
violations?238 What consumers arguably need most in the delivery of financial
services is transparency, fair treatment, and effective dispute resolution
mechanisms—factors that privacy regulation purports to regulate, but in reality, are
within the domain of consumer protection.239 For instance, data processing
activities that result in racial profiling or discrimination based on one’s marital
status or gender should be considered violations of consumer protection standards.
Under this mindset, the likely solution is the mitigation of possible privacy harms
to an individual,240 reserving the need for consent only in appropriate and limited
occasions where consumers will actually pay attention to them.241
Considering the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the digital economy,
it makes more sense to require organizations to institute a relatively flexible
framework of privacy principles emphasizing the responsible and transparent use
of personal data rather than imposing a costly and rigid ‘notice and consent’ system
that may impede innovation without achieving its purpose.242 This is what Google
suggests in the Framework for Responsible Data Protection Regulation the
company released in September to guide the United States Congress.243 While
Google’s self-interest is apparent, its recommendation complements the test-andlearn approach discussed above.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the U.S. and the EU continue to disagree about their approaches to
privacy, the NPC has put the Philippines in a precarious situation, innovationwise, by taking a clear side and dictating absolutist outcomes. This brings to mind
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one of the problems with the implementation of the Single Euro Payment Area
(‘SEPA’):
No cost-benefit study was undertaken before the SEPA
project was launched but it appears that both regulators and banks
grossly underestimated its costs. The problem of unexpectedly
difficult and expensive technological problems was compounded by
EU regulators’ notion that a pan-European electronic fund transfer
network constituted a public good, which made it easy for them to
reject any obligation to ensure there was any way for the banks to
defray the cost of creating it. Thus, the cost of modifying their
legacy systems and business practices to accommodate the SEPA
system fell squarely on the banks.244
A similar predicament exists in the Philippines in the sense that when the
NPC interpreted the DPA by importing the GDPR’s ‘notice and consent’ regime in
the delivery of financial services, it did not appear to have considered the difficult
and expensive technological problems such an interpretation would pose to the
delivery of digital financial services. An important difference, however, is that the
NPC does not—and can not—proscribe financial services providers from defraying
the costs of privacy compliance by transferring them to the consumer, who will
likely have to pay more for digital services in the end.
This paper has shown how the DPA, with its GDPR-like standard of ‘notice
and consent’ not only disrupts the delivery of digital financial services in
developing countries like the Philippines but also inherently conflicts with the use
of Big Data for innovation that may lead to financial inclusion. It also has an
anticompetitive effect by placing costly barriers to entry for SMEs that might
compete with leading digital financial services providers.
To achieve digital financial inclusion, the increasing reliance of the NPC on
‘notice and consent’ as the gatekeeper of data privacy must be dismissed in favor
of a test-and-learn, industry-based approach supervised by the BSP. This does not
mean dismissing privacy concerns altogether, as digital financial inclusion and
privacy regulation need not clash with each other. Rather, the industry must take
the lead in developing standardized data practices that balance privacy protection
and the free flows of information, ultimately creating a culture of accountability.
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Privacy awareness must be generated to supplement the need for digital financial
literacy and transparency in data processing. Privacy concerns must then be
approached as a consumer protection issue so that regulation can be designed in
proportion to the consumer risks digital financial services pose.
With the high percentage of smartphone ownership and the suite of digital
financial services offered in the market, digital financial inclusion in the Philippines
is within reach. It cannot afford a setback in the form of a restrictive and ill-fitted
‘notice and consent’ system under DPA. As the NPC has the power to impose
prohibitive penalties and even prosecute violations as crimes punishable by
imprisonment, the ‘notice and consent’ system must be challenged now, and
replaced with a more flexible and relevant privacy regulation that works towards,
and not against, financial inclusion.
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